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This study analyzes the impact of environmental and occupational
health regulation upon productivity levels and productivity growth rates
in 445 U.S. manufacturing industries between 1974 and 1986. Costs
imposed by regulation are much more significant in terms of diminished
productivity than in terms of direct compliance expenditures. The study
does not support a "technology-forcing" interpretation of EPA and OSHA
regulations, which avers that regulation pushes firms to adopt more
efficient products and processes. On the contrary, the data suggest that
regulation diverts economic resources and managerial attention away from
productivity-enhancing innovation. These productivity losses may be a one-
time event, caused by the dramatic rise in public concern and subsequent
regulation of the most polluting and unsafe industries during the 1970s.
If regulatory initiatives are to continue and we are to sustain society's
commitment to environmental quality and occupational health, creative
risk management approaches are needed that promote rather than impede
technological innovation and productivity growth in regulated industries.
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Introduction
The debate over the economic impact of environmental and
occupational health regulation has been long, acrimonious, and
inconclusive. Critics of EPA and OSHA argue that regulatory command
and control diverts economic resources and managerial attention from
productivity-enhancing technological innovation and impairs the nation's
ability to compete in world markets. Supporters counter that well-designed
regulations force the development and diffusion of cleaner, safer, and
more productive technologies. The President, Congress, and the courts
have joined the fray with Executive Orders, legislative initiatives, and
judicial reviews demanding more information and more analysis.
The contrasting views of environmental regulation result from
different interpretations of managerial incentives and of the role of market
competition in stimulating economic efficiency. Critics of EPA and OSHA
argue that management generally selects the best mix of capital, labor, and
material inputs and combines them in the most efficient manner, given the
scientific and technological knowledge available at the time. Firms that
do not are eliminated by profit-seeking rivals. Market competition
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motivates efficiency and governmental intervention gets in the way. Critics
cite the temporal coincidence of the post-1973 increase in environmental
standard-setting and decrease in economic productivity growth as a
consequence of regulatory enthusiasm.'
Supporters of EPA and OSHA regulation adopt a different
interpretation of market and governmental impacts on technological
innovation and diffusion. In their view, management exhibits considerable
uncertainty and inertia in adopting new production methods. Governmental
regulations mandating the adoption of best available pollution control
technologies promote the use of more efficient methods of production.
Economic impact studies often report that the expenditures incurred to
comply with a particular standard fall far short of predicted levels. This
is consistent with the principle that regulation motivates management to
explore new and cheaper ways to promote safety and environmental
quality. This "technology-forcing" interpretation argues that the long run
economic impact of regulation can be positive because the productivity-
enhancing impetus for technological innovation outweighs the productivity-
constraining diversion of resources towards regulatory compliance. 2
This debate turns on empirical data, and there is no shortage of
numbers that purport to measure the expenditures incurred by industry in
response to regulatory mandates.' EPA and OSHA routinely prepare or
contract for estimates of compliance costs for major rules. Industry
1. Prominent papers in this tradition include Anthony J. Barabera & Virginia D.
McConnell, The Impact ofEnvironmental Regulations on Industry Productivity, 18 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 50 (1990); Robert W. Crandall, Pollution Controls and Productivity
Growth in Basic Industries, in PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES
347-68 (Thomas G. Cowing & Rodney E. Stevenson eds., 1981); Frank M. Gollop & Marc
J. Roberts, Environmental Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of Fossil-Fueled
Electric Power Generation, 91 J. POL. ECON. 654 (1983); Wayne B. Gray, The Cost of
Regulation: OSHA, EPA, and the Productivity Slowdown, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 998 (1987);
Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Costs of Environmental Quality Regulations:
A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990); Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter
J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314
(1990).
2. Prominent papers in this tradition include Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using
Regulation to Change the Marketforlnnovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985); D.
Bruce LaPierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977). See generally Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton,
Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109 (1983); M.E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, SCI. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168.
3. See generally A.B. Jaffe et al., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. INDUSTRY (1993); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs
and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991); Adam
B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing,
33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132 (1995); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993).
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organizations often submit their own figures. University researchers and
think-tanks sometimes follow up with assessments. Although illuminating
in many ways, these diverse sources of information typically share one
major limitation: the analyses focus on short run direct compliance
expenditures on capital, labor, and materials and ignore long run impacts
on productivity. We learn much about the first year cost of workplace
ventilation systems and smokestack scrubbers but little about the effect
regulation has on management's ability to engineer more output from any
given set of inputs. Over the long term, the indirect effect that regulation
has on innovation and productivity dominates direct compliance outlays.
This study analyzes the impact of environmental and occupational
health regulation upon productivity levels and productivity growth rates
in U.S. manufacturing for the period from 1974 to 1986. The study covers
445 manufacturing industries, with data consisting of regulatory
compliance costs and multifactor input and output totals for each industry.
Productivity is measured both in terms of an index of output minus
weighted inputs and through an econometric production function analysis.
The impacts of EPA and OSHA regulations are identified both separately
and in combination. Effects are measured for the entire 1974-86 period
and for individual years. These findings must be interpreted cautiously
because of the limitations of the underlying data sources. However, by
conducting a detailed analysis over the time frame of the most aggressive
EPA and OSHA regulations, this study identifies the major productivity
impacts of regulation.
I. Innovation, Productivity, and Regulation
Economic growth is caused by the accumulation of inputs and
technological innovation.' Inputs that expand a nation's productive
capacity include labor, primary and intermediate materials, and the stock
of plant and equipment. Historically, capital has grown faster than labor,
increasing output per person and yielding more wealth available for
consumption. Innovation in technology and organization permits greater
output to be achieved with any given quantity of inputs. Through
innovation, the economy becomes more productive beyond corresponding
increases in capital, labor, and material inputs.'
4. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRODUCTIVITY AND THE
ECONOMY: A CHARTBOOK, BULLETIN 2298 (rev. 1988).
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Theoretical models attempting to predict the impact of regulation on
economic efficiency and growth often reach different conclusions
depending upon which source of growth the model identifies as primary.
In static economic models, governmental regulation invariably reduces
productivity because it constrains the choices available to management as
to inputs and outputs. In this perspective, market competition drives firms
to select the most efficient quantities and types of capital, labor, and
material inputs and the optimal scale and mix of outputs. Environmental
and occupational health regulations necessarily push management away
from the most efficient choices. Regulations that require the purchase of
new capital equipment, mandate particular work rules for employees,
prohibit the use of particular materials, or ban or tax certain outputs alter
management decisions away from those dictated by the market.
Regulations effectively shrink society's stock of productive inputs by
removing some inputs from management's control, thus inhibiting
economic efficiency and retarding economic growth.
Models focusing on the dynamic process of innovation and
productivity growth do not reach such simple conclusions about expected
regulatory effects. Growth in outputs relative to inputs results from
product and process innovations, which depend on scientific, institutional,
market, and firm-specific developments. Governmental entities have an
important role to play in furthering science and technology, although the
optimal division of labor between the public and private sectors is
debatable. It is difficult to study multifactor productivity growth because
such study requires an understanding of the determinants of innovation
over time and among different industries. Nevertheless, considerable
progress has been made in recent years in understanding the roles played
by scientific and engineering knowledge, market structures and
institutional frameworks, and the characteristics of economic organizations
in encouraging or impeding innovation. Because the efficiency impact of
regulation on innovation and productivity dominates direct resource
misallocation costs in the long run, policy prescriptions for social
regulation must be formulated in light of this evolving interpretation of
innovation and productivity.6
6. See generally Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of
Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); G. Dosi, Sources, Procedures, and
Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120 (1988).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
A. The Determinants of Economic Innovation
A key feature of technology and economic performance in the
capitalist era has been the systematic application of scientific knowledge
to production techniques. The scientific understanding of chemical,
physical, and other properties of materials and processes functions as a
pool of knowledge which can be drawn on by any firm and used to
develop more efficient processes of production or new products altogether.
This "common pool" interpretation of scientific knowledge underlies
public subsidies for scientific research in universities, governmental
entities, and other consortia. Advances in technology in particular
industries and particular time periods are due partly to the general state
of knowledge at that time.7
This view of science and technology explains only part of the changes
in products and processes in modern economies. It cannot explain the wide
differences among firms in similar industries in developing or adopting
new products and processes. Other factors impact technological change.
First, institutional and market environments have significant effects on a
firm's willingness to invest in the development of new products and
processes and upon its ability to capitalize on innovations and thereby
increase sales, revenues, and market share. Second, statutory and
regulatory provisions in patent, intellectual property, and antitrust law
affect the appropriability of innovations and influence the ability of
different firms to cooperate in the research, development, and diffusion
of new products.' Third, the scale and price elasticity of consumer
demand influence the rate of technological change in a given market.
Investment in research and development will generally be more attractive
for products with high consumer demand since the initial fixed costs can
be allocated over a larger number of individual units. Similarly, research
and development is more attractive with more price-elastic market demand
because reductions in production costs and prices yield more than
proportionate increases in sales and revenues. Fourth, the structure of
product markets, in terms of how many firms account for the majority of
7. See generally Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research and Industrial Innovation, 20
RES. POL'Y 1 (1990); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959).
8. Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1661 (1990). See generally Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Antitrust
Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor
Cooperation, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 118 (1991); David J. Teece,
Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing, and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986).
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output and revenues, appears to influence innovation differently in
different sectors. In some industries, large firms and concentrated markets
account for the majority of significant product and process improvements
because they are able to capture the economic returns from investments
in research and development. In other industries, however, small
specialized firms that move more quickly from concept to market and that
are attentive to user needs account for most innovation. Some industries
manifest a life-cycle with alternating phases of concentrated and
competitive structures depending on whether products compete primarily
on performance or price.9
The capabilities of individual firms also determine where and when
innovation occurs. In the conventional economic model of the firm,
individual organizations choose among publicly available technologies
based on relative prices for different kinds of capital and labor. Modern
interpretations of the firm highlight the firm-specific nature of much
knowledge, the costs of transmitting knowledge among firms, and the
difficulties in profitably utilizing information.10 Much of the knowledge
and insight relevant to developing new products and processes is gained
through experience. This knowledge is often tacit and imbedded in
routines and work groups rather than explicitly codified in blueprints and
manuals. Past success in one class of products and processes promotes
future success in related endeavors, whereas failure to compete at one
stage may preclude re-entry into the market."' The internal structure and
product mix of individual firms also influence their ability to innovate.
In order to protect the value of innovative breakthroughs, firms may need
to be vertically and/or horizontally integrated to manufacture products
which embody the new techniques. They face tradeoffs between
investments in large scale specialized assets which reduce manufacturing
costs for any one product design (static efficiency) and investments in
flexible generalized assets which permit rapid adaptation to new product
designs (dynamic efficiency).
The locus and nature of innovative activities vary widely among
industries, but a three-part taxonomy captures many of the essential
9. William J. Abernathy & J. Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation, TECH.
REV., June/July 1978, at 39-47. See generally Philip Anderson & Michael L. Tushman,
Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological
Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604 (1990).
10. See generally RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
11. C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, 68
HARV. BUS. REV. 79 (1990).
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differences.' 2 For some traditional manufacturing industries, such as
textiles and printing, and for many non-manufacturing industries,
innovations are developed primarily by supplier industries, such as
equipment manufacturers and producers of intermediate materials. The
textile industry, for example, relies on specialized machinery firms for
new equipment and on the chemical industry for new synthetic fibers.
Firms in supplier-dominated industries compete on the basis of rapid
adoption of new equipment and materials and invest little directly in
innovation.
A second broad class of industries is characterized by large-scale
production and heavy reliance on internally-generated product and process
innovations. This sector includes producers of standardized materials, such
as cement and glass, and producers of high volume and complex durables,
such as transport equipment and electrical machinery. While many firms
in these sectors have their own research and development units, they also
rely on learning-by-doing in actual manufacture. Some segments of these
industries rely on small, specialized suppliers, such as advanced
machinery firms, which work in close cooperation with larger producers.
The third principal class of industries consists of science-based firms
and products, where there is a direct and continuous link to new
developments in science. This segment, which includes parts of the
chemical, biotechnology, and electronics industries, engages in
performance competition on the basis of often dramatically new products.
Firms invest heavily in in-house research and development and interact
frequently with university researchers, governmental entities, and
professional organizations.
B. The Role of Environmental Regulation
The net effect of social regulation on economic innovation is an
empirical matter. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework and the three-
sector taxonomy developed by economists provide a useful context within
which to consider the likely pattern of effects.
1. Supplier-Dominated Industries
For supplier-dominated manufacturing sectors such as textiles and
most nonmanufacturing industries, the key to both productivity growth and
12. Richard R. Nelson, Capitalism as an Engine of Progress, 19 RES. POL'Y 193
(1990); Keith Pavitt, Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a
Theory, 13 RES. POL'Y 343 (1984).
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pollution prevention lies in the diffusion of new capital equipment and
materials. In principle, governmental regulations that mandate the adoption
of "best available control technologies" (BACT) and analogous
technology-based approaches to worker exposure could accelerate the
adoption of new capital and materials that are more productive, cleaner,
and less toxic.13 Some observers have claimed, for example, that
OSHA's cotton dust standard induced the cotton textile industry to invest
in new machinery which raised production speed and product quality in
addition to reducing levels of respirable cotton dust. The textile industry
exhibited strong growth in multifactor productivity during the 1970s, when
many manufacturing sectors suffered a historic slowdown.
The actual impact of technology-based regulations may diverge from
this productivity-enhancing ideal. Once the mandated level of control is
achieved, BACT standards give no incentive to innovate, and may even
give disincentives for multiplant firms to develop more efficient controls
in one plant which could then be transferred to others.' 4 Many statutes
require stricter pollution controls on new or renovated plants, which
discourages new investment and encourages the retention of antiquated
capital equipment. Due to the heterogeneous and competitive nature of
supplier-dominated industries, survival strategies often rely on quick
responses to changes in consumer preferences and a continual search for
new market niches. More vulnerable firms may be easily crushed by
heavy, uniformly-applied standards. Observed gains in average industry
productivity may be due to a winnowing of the less productive
competitors, with consequent declines in output and employment. These
considerations shed doubt on the technology-forcing interpretation of
OSHA's cotton dust standard, for example. In fact, the superior
productivity performance of the textile industry as compared to the rest
of manufacturing predated the imposition of the cotton dust standard in
1978, and was due largely to market-driven improvements in textile
machinery.' 5 There was also a very serious decline in output and
employment in the textile industry during the 1970s and 1980s, due in
large part to competition from low cost foreign firms. The survivors
presumably consisted of mills with the most productive technologies.
13. LaPierre, supra note 2.
14. See generally Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in
Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463 (1991).
15. See generally RUTH RUTrENBERG, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
COMPLIANCE WITH THE OSHA COTTON DUST RULE (1983); Baily & Chakrabarti, supra
note 5; W. Kip Viscusi, Cotton Dust Regulation: An OSHA Success Story?, 4 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 325 (1985).
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2. Scale-Intensive Industries
The large-scale continuous process, transport equipment, and related
industries generate improvements in process and product performance
internally, with some reliance on small, specialized suppliers. Innovation
in these industries is spurred by competitive market forces. Regulatory
demands for lower emissions and exposures may create an analogous
incentive for innovation.' 6 In this interpretation, mandates for reduced
emissions lead to "greener" products and processes that are profitable and
environmentally benign. 17 The benefits of government mandated
investments in new materials and equipment may spill over to other
sectors of the economy in a manner akin to technology spillovers from
governmental support for military research.
While appealing in principle, this interpretation of regulation as a spur
to innovation should be reviewed critically. Regulatory mandates for
innovative approaches to pollution reduction may compete for the same
engineering resources that would otherwise have focused on innovative
approaches to cost reduction. The total investment by firms in research
and development may shrink if managerial attention is diverted away from
the development of new products and processes toward regulatory
compliance. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that most
innovations in the core manufacturing sectors are developed by user firms
themselves, with substantially lower contributions by other private firms,
and only very small reliance on universities and governmental research
entities.' 8 The poor record of centrally planned economies to stimulate
innovation of any type highlights the relative merits of decentralized,
market-driven searches for new ways to make cleaner and safer
products. 9
3. Science-Intensive Industries
Regulatory constraints on toxic products and by-products directly
stimulate shifts in the mix of outputs in the chemical industry. Firms
enjoying economies of scope in the production of new and related products
can benefit from new markets opened by social regulation. However,
16. Ashford et al., supra note 2.
17. See M.E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, SCI. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168.
18. See Keith Pavitt, Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy
and a Theory, 13 RES. POL'Y 343 (1984).
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existing investments in capital equipment, research and development,
marketing, and other activities designed around one mix of products may
face accelerated obsolescence. The path-dependent nature of innovation
within particular firms may make fundamental changes quite difficult.
Major breakthroughs in products and processes are often accompanied by
a process of "creative destruction," as new firms and products displace
their predecessors.20
In summary, no strong predictions can be made a priori concerning
the likely influence of environmental and occupational health regulation
on innovation and productivity growth. On the one hand, regulatory
mandates for cleaner and safer products and processes may stimulate
innovative responses that reduce the actual cost of compliance below what
would be predicted based on engineering data derived from existing
control technologies. On the other hand, regulatory demands may shift
managerial and engineering resources away from the pursuit of cost-
reducing innovation, thereby impairing the productivity performance of
an industry. Moreover, significant adjustment effects are likely as firms
scramble to shift from one trajectory of innovation and productivity to
another.
II. Measurement of Multifactor Productivity
This study uses two productivity measures to evaluate regulatory
impacts. The first productivity index subtracts changes in inputs from
changes in outputs for each industry and year. This index is easy to
interpret and facilitates direct comparisons with measures of regulatory
intensity. However, it imposes a structure on the statistical relationship
between inputs and outputs which may not correspond closely to the actual
production relations. The second productivity measure uses an
econometric production function approach to estimate the true statistical
relationship between inputs and outputs. The econometric approach
examines the relationship of differences across industries and years in
rates of output growth to differences in rates of growth of capital, labor,
and material inputs. The two approaches should produce qualitatively
similar results and can provide useful checks on each other.
20. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1942).
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A. The Productivity Index
The productivity index measures multifactor productivity growth in
terms of the residual increase in output for each industry and year, over
and above what would be expected given the changes in capital, labor,
and material inputs.2 For each industry, the three types of inputs are
assigned weights corresponding to their marginal contribution to the
production of the final output. The productivity index calculates weights
for each input in terms of the share of production cost for the
manufacturing sector as a whole that is devoted to purchasing that input.
These manufacturing-wide weights are then assigned to each detailed
manufacturing industry.
Formally, the index is based on the production relationship:
(1.1) Qi, = B1Li, + B2K, + B3Mit
where Q measures output in industry i for year t, L measures labor inputs,
K measures capital inputs, and M measures intermediate materials. The
weights B,, B2, and B 3 measure the marginal contribution of labor, capital,
and materials to the production of salable output. Both inputs and outputs
are measured in logarithmic units so as to capture the multiplicative
relationships between capital, labor, and material inputs in the production
process.
Productivity growth Git is measured in terms of changes in equation
(1.1) between year t-1 and year t:
(1.2) Gi, = (Qit - Qit-t) - BI(Lit - Li,-l) - B2(KIt - Kit-) - B 3(Mit - Mil-)
The weights Bl, B2, and B 3 are calculated as the average between year
t-1 and year t of the share of payroll, capital, and materials expenditures
in the total cost of production:
(1.3) B1 = 0.5 ((payroll -, /total costs t-) + (payroll t/total costs 3)
(1.4) B3 = 0.5 ((materials costs t- / total costs t-,) +
(materials costs / total costs t ))
21. William Gullickson & Michael J. Harper, Multifactor Productivity in U.S.
Manufacturing, 1949-83, 110 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 18 (1987) (developing multifactor
productivity index); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BLS
HANDBOOK OF METHODS, BULLETIN 2414 (1992).
Vol. 12:387, 1995
Impact of Regulation on Productivity
(1.5) B2 = 1 - (B1 + B3)
Annual expenditure data on labor and materials for each industry are
readily available. Data are also available on the value of the total stock
of capital but not on the marginal contribution of capital services in each
year. A given plant or piece of equipment typically is useful for multiple
years and it is impossible to ascertain what fraction of its lifetime value
is used up in any one year. The marginal contribution of capital services
can be calculated as a residual from the contributions of labor and
materials, however, since together labor, materials, and capital account
for all production costs. The value of shipments for each industry in each
year is used as the denominator in calculating the cost share weights.
The productivity index for each particular industry i and year t (Ii)
is calculated as the product of the previous year's index (Iit,) times the
productivity growth rate (1 + Gil), with the 1974 value set to 1.0.
(1.6) it = 1.0 for t = 1974
lit= Iit-, (1 + Gil) for t > 1974
B. The Production Function
The econometric approach to multifactor productivity adopts a more
flexible form for the relation between inputs and outputs. The general
form of the relationship posits output in industry i in year t (Qi) as a
function of labor inputs in that industry and year (Lit), capital inputs in
that industry and year (IuQ, material inputs in that industry and year (Mi),
a year effect which captures the overall level of technological knowledge
publicly available, i.e., to all industries, in year t (Y), and a stochastic
term which captures the deviation of output in industry i and year t from
what would be expected, given inputs used in that year (Ui).
(2.1) Qi, = F(Lit, Kit, ill Yt, Ui)
The functional form FO is the commonly used translog, which can be
interpreted as a second order polynomial approximation to the true
underlying but unknown technological relationship between inputs and
outputs in manufacturing in any particular year.22
22. Lauritis R. Christensen et al., Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers,
55 REv. ECON. & STAT. 28 (1973).
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(2.2) Qit = Y, A0 + BLit + B2K', + B 3Mit
+ BII(Li, * Lit) + B22(Ki, * Ki) + B 33(Mit * Mit)
+ Bi2(Lit * KI) + B13(Li, * Mit) + B23(Kt * Mi) + Uit
Outputs and inputs are measured in logarithmic units. If the labor,
capital, and material inputs are indicated as a vector Xi, = [Lit, Kit, Mid,
and the translog functional form is indicated as F(X), the production
function can be described in more compact notation:
(2.3) Qi, = A0 + i X , Bi --- i Ej XitXjt Bij + Ui,
= A0 + F(X) + Ui,
Here A0 serves as an intercept term since the year effect Yt is the same
for every industry i and thus can be suppressed for notational convenience.
Productivity growth is measured using output growth (Qit - Qit-) and
the vector of input growth rates (Xi, - Xi,.) in translog form:
(2.4) (Qi, - Qit-.) = A0 + F(Xit - Xi,-,) + (Ui,- Uit-l)
where A0 now captures the effect of the change in year effects (Y,- Y,-l).
C. Data on Outputs, Inputs, and Productivity
In order to measure productivity across the whole manufacturing
sector at the most detailed level of analysis available, this study used
several databases from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of
Business Analysis (OBA), containing input and output data from 1974 to
1986 at the detailed four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
level. This divides the manufacturing sector into' 445 industries, which
vary widely in size and over time. The statistical analyses adjust for this
variance when calculating impacts for all manufacturing and for major
(two digit SIC) sectors by weighting each four digit industry observation
according to its value of shipments for each year.
While the four digit SIC level provides a detailed picture of the
manufacturing sector, it nevertheless retains considerable heterogeneity
within each industry. Each industry produces a range of outputs with a
multitude of different capital, labor, and material inputs. These
heterogeneous outputs and inputs need to be aggregated into one measure
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For output, a straightforward method of aggregation is to weight each
industry product by its price, which implies using the value of shipments
as the measure of output. This not only permits one to aggregate products,
since they are all in the same metric (U.S. dollars), but weights each
output by an indicator of its quality. In general, higher priced components
within an industry's output stream reflect higher input demands. It is
necessary, however, to take out the effects of general price inflation over
the 1974-86 period. This study used the OBA Production Data Base,
which contains value of shipments data at the four digit SIC level and
price deflators for each four digit industry.23 Inflation-adjusted data are
used here, with 1982 as the benchmark year.
Labor and material input data were obtained from the OBA Industry
Profile Data Base, derived in turn from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures and the Census of Manufactures.24 This data base provides
the number of hours worked for production workers and the number of
employees for nonproduction workers (who are assumed to work a
constant 2000 hours per year in this analysis), plus the value of
expenditures on intermediate materials. Data are available for the same
445 four digit industries contained in the OBA Production Data Base. The
production labor input measure is hours worked rather than persons
employed, since hours vary strongly over the business cycle due to
temporary layoffs, and thereby provides a much better measure of the
actual quantity of labor inputs utilized.25 Capital inputs were obtained
from the OBA Capital Stock Data Base.26 This data base developed
detailed measures of constant (1982) dollar gross and net capital stocks
from historical book values and annual information on new capital
investment and capital depreciation. This study used the net capital stock
to reflect the actual potential for capital services, i.e., after removing
depreciated capital. It aggregates the data for plant and equipment.27
23. OFFICE OF BUSINESS ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRODUCTION DATA
BASE (1989).
24. Id.
25. Expenditures on intermediate materials are presented in non-deflated, current
dollar terms in the Industry Profile Data Base. For this study, they were deflated to 1982
levels using the manufacturing sector average for the value of shipments deflators in the
Production Data Base.
26. OFFICE OF BUSINESS ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CAPITAL STOCK
DATA BASE (1989); see also JACK FAUCETr ASSOCS., CAPITAL STOCKS DATA UPDATE:
FINAL REPORTS AND PROCEDURES (1990).
27. This measures the stock of capital available in each year, not the flow of capital
services. It contrasts with the measures of labor and material inputs, which indicate the flow
of labor and material services. An unknown percent of the total lifetime value of available
plant and equipment is used up in each year. Given the impossibility of obtaining measures
of capital services separate from capital stocks, this study used stocks under the assumption
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The capital, labor, and material input measures all reflect the quantity
of inputs available for use rather than the intensity of utilization. This is
of particular importance in the analysis of productivity since the rate of
utilization varies extensively over the course of the business cycle. As
consumer demand rises and falls, firms must adjust the volume of
production more or less proportionately, although inventories act as a
buffer. This in turn implies a cyclical fluctuation in the utilization of
capital, labor, and material inputs. However, in the short run, firms have
much less control over their purchase of inputs than over their rate of
input utilization. For example, capital stocks can be slowly changed only
by altering the rate of new investment. Labor and material inputs are more
variable, but even they are subject to considerable rigidities. White collar
workers are typically employed on a monthly basis, regardless of
production levels. Blue collar workers are often employed on an hourly
basis and their rate of utilization can be adjusted to reflect variations in
consumer demand through temporary layoffs and overtime. However,
management can be reluctant to vary blue collar employment because of
the potential to alienate the workforce and lose their best employees.
Hence, employment falls more slowly than output in a business cycle
downturn and rises more slowly than output in a business cycle upturn.
Intermediate material inputs are most easily varied with changes in
consumer demand, but long term purchasing contracts cause materials
purchases to fall slowly in a business downturn and rise slowly in a
business upturn.
Cyclical rigidities of capital and, to a lesser extent, labor and material
inputs impart a distinct and well-known cyclical fluctuation to
productivity. When consumer demand falls, firms reduce output but
reduce their demand for inputs less than proportionately. Thus, the ratio
of output to input, measured in terms of multifactor productivity, declines.
Conversely, when consumer demand rises and firms increase output, their
demand for new capital, labor, and material inputs rises at a lower rate
and multifactor productivity increases. The subsequent statistical analyses
examine the impact of environmental regulation in terms of the year to
year changes in productivity in order to account for these cyclical
fluctuations.
Figure 11.1 presents in graphical form the index of multifactor
productivity over the 1974-86 period based on equation (1.6). These
numbers reflect the average productivity performance across 445 detailed
manufacturing industries, weighted by the value of shipments in order to
that the flow of services from a given quantity of capital stock is constant across
manufacturing industries.
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account for the substantial differences in scale across the individual
industries. Productivity growth was poor during most of the period,
declining sharply during the recessions of 1974-75 and 1980-82, but
improved significantly between 1983 and 1986. By 1986 multifactor
productivity for the manufacturing sector as a whole was 12.8% higher
than in 1974.
Figure 11.2 presents the year to year fluctuations in productivity
growth based on equation (1.2). Figure 11.2 highlights the pronounced
cyclical nature of productivity caused by employers adjusting output
rapidly while adjusting employment, investment, and material purchases
slowly in response to changes in consumer demand. The annual rate of
change in productivity was negative in 1974 and 1975, rose dramatically
with the recovery in 1976, declined gradually through the late 1970s,
plunged as the recession of the early 1980s began, and then grew at a
moderately high rate between 1983 and 1986.
Considerable variation in productivity growth exists both among
manufacturing industries in any one year and across years for all
industries combined. Table 11. 1 presents the distribution of multifactor
productivity across the 445 industries. The median industry did not
experience any net growth in productivity during the 1970s and did not
consistently outperform the 1974 level until the mid-1980s. However,
some industries did quite well during this period. Industries in the top
quartile experienced productivity growth of greater than 12 % over the 12
year period, with the top five percent achieving a cumulative growth of
over 33%. In contrast, the bottom quartile of industries experienced
productivity losses exceeding five percent over the 12 year period, with
the worst five percent suffering a decline of almost 20 %. High-performing
industries were typically of greater size than low-performing industries,
as indicated by the fact that the mean industry index presented in Figure
11. 1 rises faster than the median industry index in Table 11. 1.
Considerable inter-industry variation exists in annual rates of
productivity change, as evidenced in Table 11.2. The median industry
tracks the overall manufacturing industry experience, as Figure 11.2
indicates. Productivity growth is negative in 1974-75, positive but
declining for the next three years, sharply declining in 1979-80, negative
for the next two years, and consistently positive thereafter. However,
some industries experienced positive productivity growth each year, even
when the manufacturing sector as a whole performed badly. During the
1979-80 plunge, for example, one quarter of the industries reported
growth rates exceeding 1.3 % and the top five percent grew in excess of
7.1 %. Conversely, some industries posted dismal performance even
during the best of years. One quarter of the industries experienced
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negative productivity growth of more than 1.4% in 1985-86 and five
percent experienced productivity declines exceeding 6.7 % in those years.
III. Measures of Regulation
The economic impact of environmental and occupational health
regulation varies widely among manufacturing industries due to the
differences in materials, capital equipment, and processes employed. A
simple measure of regulatory coverage, distinguishing those industries
which fall within the purview of a particular standard from those that do
not, would not be able to capture the differences in productivity impacts
within the covered industries. This study distinguishes conceptually
between the direct economic cost of regulatory compliance and the indirect
cost of regulation operating through changes in multifactor productivity.
The first step is to obtain published data on direct compliance costs as the
index of regulatory intensity among covered industries and across years.
The second step entails examining the statistical association between this
measure of direct compliance expenditure and measures of productivity
and productivity growth.
Two principal sources of information exist on the expenditures made
by manufacturing industries to comply with EPA and OSHA regulations.
The Census Bureau conducts an annual survey of manufacturing
establishments to identify new capital expenditures for pollution abatement
equipment and the labor, materials, and other expenditures to operate the
equipment. Data from this survey cover the entire manufacturing sector
from 1974 to the present. They do not include capital or operating
expenditures for compliance with OSHA's occupational health regulations.
Several different sources contain information on the economic impact of
occupational health regulation. Prior to promulgating a major standard,
OSHA contracts for an economic impact assessment, which provides some
insight into the direct cost of compliance as anticipated at the time the
standard is considered. During the course of the regulatory debate, other
groups, including industry organizations, governmental oversight bodies,
and labor unions, may submit their own cost projections. In some cases,
follow-up studies have been conducted to evaluate the actual costs
incurred. All these data sources were examined for this study.
A. Pollution Abatement Expenditures
Since 1973 the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of
Commerce has surveyed a large random sample of manufacturing
establishments to obtain information on capital expenditures and operating
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costs required for pollution abatement.2" These data provide the nation's
principal source of information on the direct economic cost of reducing
discharges to air, water, and land disposal. Data are aggregated to the four
digit SIC level and published on an annual basis.29 For this study, capital
expenditures are amortized over a ten year period at a ten percent interest
rate, added to the annual operating costs, and then the aggregate
expenditure figure is divided by the value of shipments. Compliance costs
are measured relative to value of shipments to control for the wide
differences in size among four digit industries. This also controls for the
effects of price inflation on measures of compliance expenditures, since
the numerator and denominator are valued in the same year's prices.
In addition to the exclusion of OSHA compliance expenditures, two
limitations in the Census data should be noted. First, these are self-
reported figures and cannot be independently verified. Respondents have
an incentive to exaggerate compliance costs as part of their effort to
discourage further regulation. However, this exaggeration will only bias
the subsequent productivity analyses if firms in different industries
exaggerate to different degrees and if the degree of exaggeration varies
systematically with productivity growth rates. Secondly, these data cannot
clearly distinguish between capital expenditures made for pollution
abatement and capital expenditures made for market-driven reasons, as
in response to international competition. When forced to reduce their
pollution discharges, establishments may purchase new equipment that is
more efficient as well as less polluting. It is inappropriate to assign the
full cost of these capital expenditures to EPA regulation. The difficulty
in assigning costs separately to economic and environmental purposes is
less of a problem in productivity studies than in evaluations of the direct
cost of regulatory compliance, however. The economic value of new
efficiency-enhancing equipment impacts industry shipments as well as
pollution abatement capital expenditures, and hence is in the denominator
28. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT INDUSTRIAL
REPORTS: POLLUTION ABATEMENT COSTS AND EXPENDITURES, 1986 (1989).
29. For industries with low pollution abatement expenditures, data are provided only
at the more aggregate three and two digit SIC levels to maintain confidentiality. Where four
digit data are not provided, this study allocated expenditures within each two or three digit
industry to its component four digit industries in proportion to each industry's share in the
larger sector's aggregate value of shipments. Once divided by the value of shipments for
the four digit industry in question, this implies that all four digit industries within a particular
two or three digit industry have the same proportional direct regulatory cost. Generally, the
Census publishes disaggregated four digit data for industries with substantial pollution
abatement expenditures and aggregated two and three digit data for industries with few such
expenditures.
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as well as the numerator of the ultimate measure of EPA regulatory
impact.
Table III. A. 1 provides an overview of pollution abatement
expenditures as a fraction of the value of shipments for the twenty major
(two digit SIC) industry sectors in 1974, 1980, and 1986. These figures
are calculated as the average of expenditures for each detailed (four digit)
industry within each sector, weighted by the detailed industry's value of
shipments to adjust for the differences in scale. Considerable differences
exist in direct regulatory compliance expenditures across the
manufacturing sector, with the range growing over time. Pollution
abatement expenditures are highest in the paper, petroleum, chemical, and
primary metal industries, where expenditures totaled approximately one
percent of the total value of shipments in 1974 and approached or
exceeded three percent by 1986. At the low end are the apparel and
printing industries, where expenditures amounted to less than one fifth of
one percent of industry shipments throughout this period. The uneven
distribution of pollution abatement expenditures is expected, given the
very uneven distribution of pollution emissions among industries. The
EPA Toxic Release Inventory data report that the paper, petroleum,
chemical, and primary metal industries discharged 2.8 billion, 0.8 billion,
12.1 billion, and 2.6 billion pounds of toxic substances to air, water, and
land disposal in 1987, even after fifteen years of EPA regulation. In
contrast, the apparel and printing industries discharged 0.005 billion and
0.062 billion pounds in 1987.30
B. Occupational Health Expenditures
The Census survey excludes expenditures made to comply with
occupational health regulations and no comparable data exist for OSHA
standards in any other survey. As a substitute, this study analyzed and
compiled information from a wide variety of sources on anticipated and
actual expenditures for occupational health protection for four digit
manufacturing industries. This necessitated a separate analysis of each
OSHA regulation, which required criteria for selecting among OSHA
regulatory activities. OSHA mandates span a wide range of regulations
from requiring personal protective equipment to setting Permissible
Exposure Limits (PELs) to mandating disclosure of information.3 This
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1989).
31. See generally JAMES C. ROBINSON, TOIL AND TOXics: WORKPLACE STRUGGLES
AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform,
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study focused on the major regulations promulgated to directly reduce
exposure to toxic substances. It therefore excludes cost of compliance with
safety standards, industrial relations rules such as the Hazard
Communication Standard, and the minor PELs adopted from voluntary
industry guidelines in the early years of OSHA. This is necessary for
pragmatic reasons, since credible data on the other OSHA rules are not
available. It provides the advantage, moreover, of focusing on that aspect
of OSHA regulation which received the most attention and of facilitating
comparison with the EPA regulations. The study thus covers the OSHA
regulations for asbestos, vinyl chloride, coke oven emissions, cotton dust,
acrylonitrile, inorganic arsenic, lead, and ethylene oxide.32
The quality of the data on direct compliance costs varied widely
among OSHA standards. Where possible, this study relied on evaluations
made of actual expenditures subsequent to implementation of the rule.
These evaluations are available for asbestos, vinyl chloride, and cotton
dust. Alternatively, the study relied on the principal economic impact
study contracted for by OSHA itself, in conjunction with subsequent
OSHA comments published in the Federal Register based on industry
testimony and submissions. This approach was used for coke oven
emissions, acrylonitrile, inorganic arsenic, lead, and ethylene oxide.33
Compliance costs were treated in a manner analogous to EPA regulatory
compliance costs. Capital expenditures were amortized34 and added to
annual operating costs35 and then divided by the industry's value of
shipments for each year. The occupational health compliance cost data
suffer from some of the same limitations as the pollution abatement data.
Even the post-regulatory follow-up studies rely ultimately on industry
statements concerning expenditures, which raise the same difficulty in
6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989).
32. The benzene standard is not included, since the 1978 version was overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court and a revised version was not promulgated until 1987.
33. Detailed case studies of each major OSHA health regulation are included as
Appendices I-VIII in JAMES C. ROBINSON, OSHA REGULATION AND MANUFACTURING
PRODUCTIVITY (1994).
34. Where the underlying data sources amortize capital expenditures, the amortized
capital figures are used directly. While this results in a range of amortization periods and
interest rates, it was judged to be preferable than to impose a single period and rate since
true amortization periods and interest rates vary and are captured at least to some extent in
the impact evaluations. In some cases, only amortized capital expenditures are available,
with no information on either the amortization period or the interest rate used.
35. The economic impact studies typically estimate annual operating costs but do not
indicate how long operating costs will continue at the first year's level. Generally, one
expects that annual operating costs should decline as new capital is installed and exposures
are reduced. In this analysis it is assumed that annual operating costs decline by 10% each
year.
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allocating capital expenditures between protective equipment and
efficiency enhancement goals.
Table III.B. 1 provides an overview of OSHA compliance expenditures
relative to industry shipments for the twenty two digit SIC manufacturing
sectors. Only one sector, chemical and allied products, incurred any costs
complying with OSHA health regulations in 1974. By 1980, the high point
in OSHA compliance expenditures, half of the sectors incurred compliance
costs, but in every case these fell below one-fifth of one percent of
industry shipments. The most heavily affected sectors were primary
metals, textile mills, and stone, clay, and glass products. Compliance
expenditures declined after 1980 as industries adjusted to the regulatory
mandates of the 1970s and as the pace of new regulation declined.
C. Trends in EPA and OSHA Compliance Costs
Figure III. C. 1 presents the trend in EPA and OSHA compliance costs
as a fraction of the value of shipments for the entire manufacturing sector
from 1974 to 1986. The contrast between the two regulatory agency
impacts is striking. Most obviously, expenditures on compliance with
environmental regulations dwarf those on compliance with regulations
promulgated to protect worker health. Pollution abatement expenditures
rose steadily throughout the period, with only a slight dip in 1984, while
expenditures for occupational health protection peaked in 1980 and
declined thereafter. The decline in OSHA compliance costs reflects the
wane of regulatory enthusiasm at OSHA after the inauguration of
President Reagan in 1981. The continued rise in pollution abatement
expenditures relative to industry output value is due to the compliance
initiatives required by the major environmental protection statutes
legislated in the 1970s. Compliance costs for EPA and OSHA regulations
combined grew from 0.46% of value of shipments for the entire
manufacturing sector in 1974 to 1.14% in 1986.
Figure III.C.2 presents the year-to-year rate of change in pollution
abatement and occupational health expenditures over the 1974-86 period
to highlight the variability across years and its sensitivity to the general
cycle of economic activity. While pollution abatement expenditures exhibit
positive growth relative to industry output in all years except 1984, the
rate of growth fluctuates significantly due to both changes in pollution
control expenditures (the numerator) and industry value of shipments (the
denominator). The almost linear time trend of pollution abatement
expenditures relative to industry shipments presented in Figure III. C. 1
indicates that pollution abatement expenditures (the numerator) fluctuate
in the same cyclical pattern as do industry shipments (the denominator).
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However, the amplitude of fluctuation for pollution abatement
expenditures is smaller than that for industry output. As a consequence,
as Figure III. C.2 indicates, pollution abatement expenditures as a fraction
of industry expenditures rise during a business recession and fall during
a business expansion. Major peaks in pollution abatement expenditures
relative to total costs and revenues thus occurred during the OPEC-related
recession of 1974-75 and in the more serious recession of 1981-82, while
major declines are observed during the business recoveries of 1976-80 and
1983-84. The one striking exception to this inverse cyclical relationship
between pollution abatement expenditures and business expansion occurred
in 1984-86, where pollution abatement expenditures rose sharply relative
to value of industry shipments despite a relatively good economic climate.
In order to measure the variation among manufacturing industries in
the combined impact of environmental and occupational health regulation,
EPA and OSHA compliance expenditures were summed. Table III.C. 1
presents descriptive statistics on this combined measure of regulation for
the 445 manufacturing industries during the 1974 to 1986 period. While
some industries made no compliance expenditures during these years,
others shouldered a significant burden. The typical (median) industry
invested 0.15% of the value of its output on pollution abatement and
occupational health in 1974, 0.28% in 1980, and 0.44% in 1986. The
distribution of expenditures among industries is highly skewed, however,
with some industries making substantially larger commitments. As evident
in Table III. C. 1, the upper quartile of industries invests at a rate four
times that of the bottom quartile. The top five percent of industries
devoted more than 1.5 % of total production costs to regulatory compliance
in 1974, more than 3.0% in 1980, and more than 4.5% in 1986. This
skewed distribution of pollution abatement expenditures is consistent with
the very skewed distribution of pollution emissions among manufacturing
industries.
Table III. C.2 presents analogous descriptive statistics for the variation
among manufacturing industries in the year-to-year changes in regulatory
compliance expenditures relative to total costs and revenues over the 1974-
75 through 1985-86 period. The median industry generally tracks the
experience of the manufacturing sector as whole, depicted in Figure
III.C.2, though with less pronounced cyclical fluctuations. The most
heavily impacted quarter of industries experienced higher annual rates of
growth in regulatory compliance expenditures, often by a substantial
margin. The five percent of industries most heavily impacted consistently
reported annual rates of growth between 30% and 70% in compliance
expenditures relative to shipments. On the other hand, however, some
industries reported significant declines in the burden of regulation in
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particular years. The most favored five percent of industries reported
declines in compliance costs relative to total costs exceeding 15 % in many
years.
IV. Econometric Models and Results
A. Specification of the Statistical Models
In order to quantify the incremental impact of environmental and
occupational health regulation on productivity and productivity growth,
a series of multivariate statistical analyses were performed combining the
measures of productivity developed in Section II and the measures of EPA
and OSHA regulation developed in Section III. Four basic specifications
were adopted, corresponding to the four measures of productivity: the
multifactor productivity index, the growth rate in multifactor productivity,
the translog production function, and the first-differenced (rate of growth)
production function. Two sets of regulation measures were used with each
of these specifications. In the first set of regressions, EPA and OSHA
compliance expenditures relative to total costs were included individually
to examine their relative importance. In the second, the effects of EPA
and OSHA were combined into a single measure of regulatory compliance
expenditures. These eight regression models were estimated for the pooled
1975-86 data and for each year individually. A set of nineteen variables
for the major (two digit SIC) manufacturing sector was included to control
for differences among detailed industries in basic technological and market
factors.
The multifactor productivity index model includes both outputs and
inputs in the dependent variable and so is the simplest to present.
(4.1) Ii, = A0 + Si, A, + Rit A 2 + Uit
Productivity for industry i in year t (Ia) is a function of a year effect (Ao),
the two digit manufacturing sector of which it is a part (Si), regulatory
compliance expenditures relative to total production costs (R1), and
unmeasured factors captured in the error term (U,). When this model is
applied using data from only one year, the year effect takes the form of
a conventional intercept term. When the pooled 1975-86 data are used,
it takes the form of year-specific intercepts.
The growth rate in multifactor productivity is the year-to-year change
in (4.1), which from (1.6) equals Gt.
(4.2) Gi, = A0 + (R, - Rt 1) A2 + (Ui - Uit. 1)
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The rate of growth in multifactor productivity, i.e., the change in output
minus the change in inputs, weighted by cost shares, is a function of the
year effect (Ao), the change in regulatory expenditures relative to total
costs (Rit - Rit.i), and the change in unmeasured influences captured in the
error term. The year effect corresponds to the annual rate of change in
productivity, portrayed in Figure 11.2, in contrast to the annual level of
productivity, portrayed in Figure 11. 1. The time-invariant effects of the
two digit manufacturing sector (St) are differenced away, since they affect
output equally in year t-1 and year t (Si, = Sit.1 for all i).
The translog production function uses industry output as the dependent
variable and the various inputs as independent variables, in addition to the
year, two digit sector, and regulatory effects:
(4.3) Qit = A0 + Si, A, + Rt A2 + F(Xi) B + Ui,
Qjt is the value of shipments of industry i in year t (in logarithmic units),
Xit is the vector of capital, labor, and material inputs (also in logarithmic
units), and the other variables are as defined in the productivity index
equation. The input vector is used in the translog functional form defined
in (2.3), and is indicated as F(Xij.
The rate of growth version of the translog model, described in (2.4),
is specified as the first-differences of (4.3), where (Qi, - Qi,-1) is the rate
of growth (logarithmic change) in output:
(4.4) (Qi - Qit-1) = A0 + (Rt - Rt-1) A 2 + F(Xi, - Xit-l)B + (Uit- Ut-l)
B. Parameter Estimates
Table IV. 1 presents parameter estimates for the pooled 1974-86 data
using the productivity index (4.1), translog production function (4.3),
productivity index growth (4.2), and first differences production function
(4.4) models. Here the data from all twelve years are combined into one
analysis. In order to simplify the exposition, only the coefficients on the
EPA and OSHA regulatory variables (compliance costs .as a fraction of
total expenditures) are presented. Industries with high pollution abatement
compliance expenditures relative to total production costs experience
significantly lower levels and rates of growth in multifactor productivity
than industries with low compliance expenditures. The parameter estimates
for pollution abatement expenditures are all negative and statistically
significant. In contrast, the coefficients on occupational health
expenditures are very small, of mixed signs, and not statistically different
from zero. This quantitative importance of EPA relative to OSHA is not
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surprising, given the magnitude of difference in the direct compliance
costs ascribed to pollution abatement and occupational health in Figure
III.C. 1.
Table IV.2 presents parameter estimates for the combined EPA and
OSHA regulatory variables from the annual productivity and productivity
growth regressions for 1974-75 through 1985-86. In contrast to the models
described in Table IV. 1, each year's regulatory compliance costs and
productivity data are analyzed individually. The figures in the first column
thus reflect twelve separate regressions of the productivity index model
(4.1), those in the second column reflect twelve separate regressions of
the production function model (4.3), those in the third column reflect
twelve separate regressions of the productivity growth model (4.2), and
those in the fourth column reflect twelve separate regressions of the first-
differenced production function model (4.4). There is some variation
among years in the incremental impact of regulatory compliance
expenditures on productivity and productivity growth, but the overall
pattern is quite consistent with the estimates derived from the pooled
analyses presented in Table IV. I. In every case the sign of the association
is negative, and in forty-three out of forty-eight cases it is statistically
significant at the p <. 10 level. The subsequent discussion will use these
year-specific parameter estimates when calculating the cumulative impact
of regulation on productivity.
V. The Impact of Regulation on Productivity
The impact of EPA and OSHA regulation on productivity (Ma)
depends on both the extent of direct compliance costs in each industry
(Ri), summarized in Section III, and the incremental impact of direct
compliance costs on productivity (A2), presented in Section IV. The
impact on industry i in year t is calculated by multiplying compliance
costs as a fraction of total costs by the parameter estimate, where the year-
specific parameters A2 are taken from column 1 of Table IV.2.
(5.1) Mi, = Ri, A 2
Table V. 1 provides an overview of annual reductions in multifactor
productivity (Mi) for the twenty major manufacturing sectors for 1975,
1980, and 1986. The combination of rising compliance costs (Ri) and
relatively constant productivity parameters (A) ensures that the annual
impact of environmental regulation on manufacturing productivity (Ma)
grew throughout this period. The greatest one-year impacts occurred for
the primary metals, petroleum products, chemicals, and paper sectors,
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which suffered productivity losses in 1985-86 of 0.055, 0.045, 0.042, and
0.039 points, respectively, against the manufacturing-wide index of 1.000.
Again, these are the manufacturing industries responsible for the greatest
volume of toxic discharges. The smallest one-year impacts in 1985-86
occurred in the apparel (0.000 points), industrial machinery (0.004),
tobacco (0.005), and printing and publishing (0.003) sectors. The
manufacturing sector as a whole suffered a 0.017 point reduction in the
multifactor productivity index in 1985-86 due to environmental regulation,
a doubling of the 0.009 point reduction experienced in 1974-75.
However, the full impact of environmental and occupational health
regulation must be conceptualized in terms of the cumulative impact over
multiple years rather than simply as the incremental impact in any one
year. Productivity losses in one year lower the base upon which efforts
to increase productivity in the next year must build. This requires one to
estimate the rate of growth over time in productivity in the counterfactual
situation of no regulation, as a standard against which to compare the rate
of growth in productivity that actually occurred. The multifactor potential
productivity index Pli, can be defined in a fashion analogous to the actual
productivity index li,, based on (1.6) and (5.1).
(5.2) Pli, = 1.0 for t= 1974'
Plit = Iit. I (1 + Git (1 - Mi) for t > 1974
Intuitively, the multifactor potential productivity index for industry i in
year t is the actual index in the previous year (lit.) multiplied by a factor
accounting for overall growth in productivity (1 + Git and a factor
replacing the productivity lost due to regulation (1 - Mi. Here (1 - MJO
> 1 since Mi, is negative.
The cumulative percentage impact of regulation from 1974 to year
t, Zit, can be calculated as the difference between actual and potential
productivity, divided by potential productivity, and multiplied by 100:
(5.3) Zi, = [(Plit_ i) / PiJ 100
Table V.2 presents the cumulative loss in multifactor productivity (Zit)
in 1975, 1980, and 1986 for the twenty major manufacturing sectors. As
expected, the cumulative impacts are substantially larger than the
incremental impacts documented in Table V. 1. By 1986, the cumulative
reduction in actual productivity compared to potential productivity was
31.5% in primary metals, 25.3% in petroleum products, 28.0% in
chemicals, and 27.4% in paper products. These reductions in economic
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productivity should be evaluated in light of the reductions in pollution
achieved through regulation. Between 1970 and 1984, for example, carbon
dioxide emissions were reduced by 43% in primary metals, 79% in
petroleum products, and 39% in the chemical industry .36 Emissions of
nitrous oxides in those three industries were reduced by 30%, 71 %, and
41 % respectively. Emissions of volatile organic compounds decreased by
54% in primary metals but increased by 5% in petroleum products and
by 21% in the chemical industry. Emissions of lead decreased by 92%
in primary metals (which accounted for the vast majority of total
manufacturing emissions). Emissions of particulate matter (PM10)
declined by 68% in primary metals, 57% in petroleum products, and 39%
in the chemical industry. Needless to say, the expenditures for pollution
abatement and occupational health were not confined to controlling air
emissions, but extended to water discharges, worker health risks, and
other targets.
There is substantial variability among the 445 detailed manufacturing
industries in the cumulative impact of regulation on multifactor
productivity. Table V.3 presents descriptive statistics on Zit for the 1975-
86 period. The typical (median) industry suffered losses that grew from
0.3% in 1975 to 5.2% in 1986. The impacts were highly skewed,
however, consistent with the data in Table III.C. 1 highlighting the very
skewed distribution of direct regulatory compliance expenditures. The
most heavily impacted quarter of the industries registered losses in actual
compared to potential productivity greater than 10.7% by 1986, while the
most heavily impacted five percent of industries suffered losses exceeding
45.4%. The cumulative impact for the manufacturing sector as a whole
can be derived from these figures by weighting each detailed industry by
its share in value of output for all manufacturing. Weighting in this
manner highlights the fact that larger industries tended to suffer greater
losses in productivity growth than their smaller counterparts. Overall, the
U.S. manufacturing sector attained a level of multifactor productivity in
1986 that was 11.4% lower than it would have attained, absent the growth
in environmental and occupational health regulation since 1974.
Figure V. 1 plots the index of potential productivity (Pli) for the 1974-
86 period along with the index of productivity actually achieved (IJ from
Figure 11.1. By construction, both indexes equal 1.0 in 1974. They
diverge thereafter, with the shortfall of actual compared to potential
productivity growing each year.
36. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION
TRENDS, 1900-1992 (1993).
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VI. Discussion of Econometric Results
In the long run, the economic impact of environmental and
occupational health regulation depends primarily on their influence on the
rate of innovation and the growth in multifactor productivity. This, in
turn, depends on three factors: the trend in direct compliance
expenditures, the impact of these compliance costs on innovation and
productivity growth in each individual year, and the cumulative impact
of the innovation and productivity effects over multiple years. This study
has presented evidence on the direction and magnitude of each of these
factors.
The trend in direct expenditures due to EPA and OSHA regulation
depends on the number of new regulatory initiatives and on management's
ability to comply with these mandates in an efficient manner. The
published case studies of regulation have documented management's
ability to develop methods of compliance that are cheaper than initially
envisioned, precisely because they have an economic incentive to do so.
Cost-reducing management responses to regulation appear to have been
overwhelmed, however, by the increased number and complexity of new
regulations. Regulatory compliance costs in manufacturing industries grew
during the 1974-1986 period both in absolute terms and, more
importantly, relative to overall manufacturing costs and revenues. As
presented in Figure III. C. 1, direct compliance expenditures as a fraction
of value of shipments more than doubled during this twelve year period,
from 0.46% in 1974 to 1.14% in 1986. This trend is due primarily to
environmental regulation; as a fraction of industry costs and revenues,
compliance expenditures for occupational health regulation peaked in 1980
and declined thereafter.
Whatever the trend in direct compliance expenditures, it is important
to focus on the indirect economic impact of environmental and
occupational health regulation on innovation and productivity growth. The
data analyzed in this study reveal no "technology-forcing" impact of
environmental and occupational health regulation for the manufacturing
sector as a whole. Expenditures by management to comply with EPA and
OSHA mandates appear to have retarded rather than promoted the growth
in multifactor productivity during the 1974-86 period. The incremental
impact of compliance expenditures on productivity is significantly negative
regardless of whether one uses an index of multifactor productivity, an
econometric production function, year-to-year changes in multifactor
productivity, or a first-differenced specification of the production function.
Similar point estimates are obtained from the pooled 1974-86 data and for
each year individually. This does not imply that individual regulations
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have not spurred productivity-enhancing innovation in some instances; on
the contrary, the case study literature documents numerous examples.37
However, these productivity-increasing instances are outweighed by the
productivity-decreasing instances, and the net effect on productivity
growth is negative.
The incremental impact of EPA and OSHA regulation on the
manufacturing sector as a whole, calculated as the weighted average of
annual impacts for the 445 detailed industries, grew from a 1.1 % annual
reduction in multifactor productivity in 1974-75 to a 2.5% annual
reduction in 1985-86. However, the most important findings of this study
concern the cumulative impact of environmental and occupational health
regulation over time, as distinct from the incremental effect in any one
year. The productivity-reducing effect of one year's regulatory compliance
lowers the base upon which the next year must build. Small annual effects
snowball into more substantial productivity deficits. The cumulative
impact of regulation is analogous to the cumulative impact of compound
rates of interest, but with the opposite effect on economic assets. The
cumulative effect through 1986 on the manufacturing sector as a whole,
computed as the weighted mean of impacts on the 445 detailed industries,
was to reduce multifactor productivity by 11.4% from the level it would
have achieved absent EPA and OSHA regulation.
The productivity effects obtained using these detailed industry data
from one major sector of the economy, manufacturing, are consistent with
results reported in other studies that use more aggregated industry data
from the economy as a whole. Hazilla and Kopp model the adjustments
in prices, output, and employment that occurred in thirty-six major (two
digit SIC) manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries between 1974
and 1990 due to environmental regulation.3" They note that the
engineering estimates of regulatory compliance developed by EPA
significantly overstate the direct costs of compliance while ignoring the
indirect costs. As firms incur pollution control costs, they raise prices to
consumers, who then reduce purchases. This decline in demand leads
firms to reduce output, which reduces direct pollution abatement costs
(and all other production costs) and, in turn, employment. Employment
falls more slowly than output in regulated industries, however, and this
results in a decline in productivity. Analogous impacts of environmental
regulation are reported by Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, who analyze thirty-
37. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and
Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (1983).
38. Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Costs of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990).
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five major manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries within a
general equilibrium model. 39 They conclude that the cumulative impact
of environmental regulation between 1973 and 1985 was to reduce output
in the economy as a whole by 2.6% in 1985, compared to what it would
have been without regulation.
Conclusion
The productivity-reducing burden of past regulation haunts the future
of environmental and occupational health policy. A significant fraction of
American legislators now apparently believe that EPA and OSHA are
imposing costs on society out of proportion to the benefits they generate.
The regulatory agencies are besieged with demands for more formalized
risk assessments and cost-benefit studies, which proponents assume will
conclude that less rather than more regulation is needed.' This revolt
against regulation is emerging now partly due to special political
circumstances. In part, however, the current challenge to environmental
and occupational health policy indicates the cumulative effects of
regulation on economic performance over many years.
It is customary for discussions of the economic impact of
environmental and occupational health regulation to conclude with a plea
for more cost-effective policies. Cost-effective regulation mandates ends
but not means, establishes incentives but does not dictate methods of
compliance.41  Choice-preserving rather than choice-constraining
initiatives encourage management to develop new and cheaper methods
for achieving the desired goal. These principles have enjoyed increasing
acceptance in policy circles in recent years, as witnessed by the plethora
of emissions trading, pollution tax, information disclosure, and related
initiatives.42
The indirect impact of EPA and OSHA regulation on productivity
growth has received less prominence in political debates. In part this may
have been due to an artificial separation between short run and long run
economic performance, the former being ascribed to visible direct
39. See Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S.
Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314 (1990).
40. Special Analysis of Contracting for Regulatory Relief, 18 CHEMICAL REG. REP.
(BNA) S3-22 (1995).
41. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Casefor Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Breger et al.,
supra note 14; Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1981).
42. R.W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1989).
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expenditures and the latter to less visible determinants of technological
change. A common thread, however, ties together the policy implications
of the direct cost of regulatory compliance and the indirect productivity
impacts. In both cases the solution lies in innovation. Public policy
demands incentives and institutions that encourage management to design
environmental and occupational health concerns in from the beginning and
to maintain those concerns throughout the cycle of production and
distribution.
In their first two decades, EPA and OSHA pursued command and
control policies in hopes of forcing technological innovation. Despite
important gains in environmental quality and occupational health
protection, their economic impact was significantly negative. The
challenge today is to pursue incentive-conscious policies that stimulate
technological innovation and facilitate continuous organizational adaptation
to changing environmental and economic opportunities.
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TABLE II.1
INDEX OF MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
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TABLE 11.2
ANNUAL CHANGES IN MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
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TABLE III.A.1
POLLUTION ABATEMENT EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF VALUE
OF SHIPMENTS FOR MAJOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS, 1974-86.
SIC INDUSTRY SECTOR
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
TOBACCO PRODUCTS
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
LUMBER & WOOD PRODUCTS
FURNITURE & FIXTURES
PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PRINTING & PUBLISHING
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS
RUBBER & MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS
LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS
STONE, CLAY & GLASS PRODUCTS
PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
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TABLE III.B.1
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF VALUE
OF SHIPMENTS FOR MAJOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS, 1974-86.
SIC INDUSTRY SECTOR 1974 1980 1986
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
TOBACCO PRODUCTS
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
LUMBER & WOOD PRODUCTS
FURNITURE & FIXTURES
PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PRINTING & PUBLISHING
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS
RUBBER & MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS
LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS
STONE, CLAY & GLASS PRODUCTS
PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
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TABLE III.C.1
POLLUTION ABATEMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
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TABLE III.C.2
ANNUAL CHANGES IN POLLUTION ABATEMENT
AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
AS A FRACTION OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
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THE SEPARATE IMPACTS OF EPA AND OSHA REGULATION:
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR ALL YEARS 1974-86 (N=5340)
PRODUCTIVITY LOG OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE IN
INDEX INDUSTRY GROWTH INDUSTRY
(1974=1.00) OUTPUT RATE OUTPUT









NOTE: All regressions include 11 year variables.
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 also include 19 two-digit SIC
industry sector variables.
* p<.1 0
** p<. 0 5
*** p<.01
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TABLE IV.2
THE COMBINED IMPACT OF EPA AND OSHA REGULATION:
















































-0.015 *** -0.021 *** -0.025 *** -0.020 ***
NOTE: *p<.10
•* p<. 0 5
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TABLE V.1
ANNUAL REDUCTION IN THE INDEX
OF MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (1974=1.00)
DUE TO EPA AND OSHA REGULATION
FOR MAJOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS, 1975-86.
SIC INDUSTRY 1975 1980 1986
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
TOBACCO PRODUCTS
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
LUMBER & WOOD PRODUCTS
FURNITURE & FIXTURES
PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PRINTING & PUBLISHING
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS
PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS
RUBBER & MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS
LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS
STONE, CLAY & GLASS PRODUCTS
PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
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TABLE V.2
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN PRODUCTIVITY
DUE TO EPA AND OSHA REGULATION
FOR MAJOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS, 1975-86.
SIC INDUSTRY 1975 1980 1986
20 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 0.333 2.707 6.132
21 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 0.252 1.909 4.081
22 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 0.331 3.688 7.528
23 APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 0.000 0.000 0.000
24 LUMBER & WOOD PRODUCTS 0.737 4.390 9.447
25 FURNITURE & FIXTURES 0.465 2.845 5.721
26 PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS 2.371 16.070 27.396
27 PRINTING & PUBLISHING 0.132 0.918 2.119
28 CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS 2.152 15.411 28.037
29 PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS 2.037 12.667 25.267
30 RUBBER & MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS 0.487 3.197 6.359
31 LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS 0.316 2.751 6.327
32 STONE, CLAY & GLASS PRODUCTS 1.712 10.469 19.412
33 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 2.225 17.400 31.527
34 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 0.363 2.554 6.227
35 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT 0.239 1.692 3.209
36 ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 0.308 2.265 5.294
37 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 0.314 2.254 5.667
38 INSTRUMENTS & RELATED PRODUCTS 0.348 2.395 5.486
39 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 0.268 1.607 4.164
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TABLE V.3
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN PRODUCTIVITY
DUE TO EPA AND OSHA REGULATION
FOR 445 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1975-86.
5TH
PERCENTILE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
FIRST
QUARTILE
0.127
0.280
0.442
0.629
0.918
1.242
1.546
1.795
2.321
2.545
2.694
3.097
MEDIAN THIRD
QUARTILE
0.275 0.613
0.626 1.323
0.941 1.984
1.305 2.650
1.793 4.025
2.219 4.999
2.659 5.945
3.197 7.036
3.874 8.081
4.324 8.907
4.569 9.428
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986 10.699
95TH
PERCENTILE
3.204
7.260
11.479
15.297
19.992
24.194
27.433
33.090
38.495
40.940
42.263
45.3825.225
